

## Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 CAIRO 05906

EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

USDEL NO. 18

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR EG IS JO US  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KAMEL FEB 23

SUMMARY: EILTS AND I HAD A VERY GOOD MEETING WITH FOREIGN  
MINISTER KAMEL THIS EVENING, COVERING ALL THE MAJOR  
ISSUES. I BRIEFED KAMEL ON MY TALKS IN JERUSALEM AND  
RELATED ISRAELI CONCERN OVER THE LACK OF SYMMETRY BETWEEN  
THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMITTEES. I  
CONVEYED BEGIN'S PROPOSAL FOR RECONVENING OF POLITICAL  
COMMITTEE TALKS. KAMEL REITERATED EGYPTIAN VIEW THAT THE  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD RECONVENE ONLY AFTER AGREEMENT  
IS REACHED ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. I PUT FOR-  
WARD ON PERSONAL BASIS IDEA OF ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUB-  
COMMITTEE; WHILE BOUTROS GHALI SHOWED SOME INTEREST IN IT,  
KAMEL EVINCED NO ENTHUSIASM AND FINALLY SAID HE THOUGHT  
MEETING WITH ISRAELIS IN ANY POLITICAL COMMITTEE FRAME-  
WORK SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE  
DECLARATION. REGARDING THE DECLARATION, KAMEL SAID SADAT  
HAD AGREED, FOLLOWING HIS TALK WITH EILTS FEBRUARY 22, TO  
WITHDRAW THE LATEST EGYPTIAN DRAFT (THE AL BAZ PAPER) AND  
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RETURN TO THE DRAFT THAT KAMEL HAD GIVEN ME ON FEBRUARY 1.  
KAMEL ASKED THAT I GIVE THE ISRAELIS THIS DRAFT BUT PRE-  
SENT IT WITH TODAY'S DATE. EILTS AND I SAID WE THOUGHT  
THIS WAS GOOD DECISION, BUT I POINTED OUT THAT THE EGYP-  
TIANS HAD INTRODUCED LANGUAGE IN THE FEBRUARY 1 DRAFT  
THAT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL IN OUR EFFORT TO GET ISRAELI  
AGREEMENT ON THE PRESIDENT'S ASWAN LANGUAGE FOR THE

PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH OF THE DECLARATION. KAMEL THEN SAID EGYPT WOULD ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE PROVIDED HUSSEIN DID AND WOULD JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS MADE IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT EGYPTIANS GIVE US IDEAS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I MADE QUITE A HARD PITCH ON THIS, POINTING OUT THAT WE NEED TO HAVE EGYPTIAN THOUGHTS TO USE BOTH WITH HUSSEIN AND TO BEGIN MOVING THE ISRAELIS TOWARD MODIFICATION OF THEIR SELF-RULE PLAN. KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DURING CAMP DAVID TALKS SADAT HAD SAID EGYPT WOULD PROVIDE IDEAS, BUT KAMEL WAS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT HIMSELF TO GIVING US THESE RIGHT AWAY. HE SUGGESTED I FIRST DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH HUSSEIN AND SAID IT MIGHT BE BEST FOR EGYPT AND JORDAN TO PUT THEIR IDEAS TOGETHER BEFORE PRESENTING ANYTHING TO THE ISRAELIS. KAMEL PROMISED TO "SLEEP ON IT", BUT IT WAS CLEAR FROM HIS REMARKS THAT WE CANNOT EXPECT ANYTHING FROM HIM BEFORE MY RETURN TO CAIRO FROM ISRAEL NEXT WEEK, AND AT MOST EGYPTIANS WILL ONLY AGREE TO THEIR IDEAS BEING DISCUSSED WITH HUSSEIN AND SAUDIS. ABOUT MID-WAY THROUGH MEETING KAMEL SAID SADAT IS VERY CONCERNED THAT BEGIN WILL PUT PRESSURE ON USG DURING UPCOMING VISIT TO MODIFY POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CLOSE OF SADAT'S VISIT. SADAT ASKED KAMEL TO CONVEY TO US THAT SADAT CONSIDERS IT OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HOLD TO THE FEBRUARY STATEMENT. A VERY SERIOUS SITUATION WOULD BE CREATED IF  
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IT WERE MODIFIED. END SUMMARY.

1. MEETING LASTED JUST OVER TWO HOURS. WITH KAMEL WERE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI AND KAMEL'S CHEF DU CABINET AHMAD MAHER, WHO WAS NOTETAKER ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. NOTETAKER ON OUR SIDE WAS KORN.

I OPENED BY RECALLING THAT DURING PRESIDENT SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON IT WAS AGREED THAT I WOULD COME BACK TO THE AREA TO WORK ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND TO BEGIN EXPLORATORY DISCUSSIONS REGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD INVITE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO COME TO WASHINGTON, AND BEGIN'S VISIT IS NOW SET FOR MARCH 14-15. I SAID I HOPED THAT IN MY TIME HERE WE COULD ACCOMPLISH AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO NARROW THE DIFFERENCES AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S TALKS WITH BEGIN, WHICH WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT. I THEN SET OUT MY TRAVEL PLANS AND TOLD KAMEL THAT I WOULD BE STAYING IN THE AREA UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE BEGIN VISIT. KAMEL IMMEDIATELY ASKED IF I WOULD BE GOING TO JORDAN AND I SAID I WOULD, BUT

PROBABLY NOT UNTIL MARCH 3 SINCE HUSSEIN WILL NOT BE BACK FROM LONDON BEFORE THEN. I SAID I WAS PREPARED TO STAY IN CAIRO THROUGH TOMORROW AND SATURDAY, OR HOWEVER LONG NECESSARY. I WANTED TO HAVE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF EGYPTIAN VIEWS AND CONCRETE PROPOSALS TO PRESENT TO ISRAELIS AND WOULD LEAVE ALL THE TIME REQUIRED FOR THAT.

3. I THEN WENT OVER WITH KAMEL MY TALKS IN JERUSALEM. I SAID I HAD TOLD BEGIN AND DAYAN THAT I HAD ORIGINALLY THOUGHT I WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONVEY TO THEM DURING

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EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

MY FEBRUARY 21-22 VISIT TO ISRAEL COMMENTS FROM EGYPT ON THE DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. BUT WE HAD LEARNED THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD WANTED TO REVIEW EGYPTIAN COMMENTS AND MAKE SOME CHANGES. THEREFORE, I HAD LIMITED MYSELF TO GIVING THE ISRAELIS A GENERAL ORAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PAPER GIVEN US BY KAMEL ON FEBRUARY 1. KAMEL INTERRUPTED TO ASK CONFIRMATION THAT I HAD NOT GIVEN THE ISRAELIS THE TEXT OF THE FEBRUARY 1 PAPER AND I ASSURED HIM THAT I HAD NOT. I SAID I HAD FOUND THE ISRAELIS SERIOUS IN WANTING TO MOVE AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. THEY SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN RECEIVING EGYPT'S LANGUAGE AND THEY HOPED I WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TO GIVE THEM WHEN I CAME BACK.

4. I SAID THAT IN OUR TALKS IN JERUSALEM PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAD SPOKEN AT LENGTH ON THE LACK OF SYMMETRY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS Owing TO THE FACT THAT THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IS IN SESSION IN CAIRO WHILE THE JERUSALEM POLITICAL COMMITTEE IS SUSPENDED. I POINTED OUT THAT BEGIN FEELS

THIS IS NOT A DESIRABLE SITUATION OR ONE THAT SHOULD  
CONTINUE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. I MADE CLEAR THAT IT  
IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE ISRAELIS, IN RAISING THIS, TO  
SUGGEST THAT THE WORK OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE BE SUS-  
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PENDED BECAUSE OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE.  
WHAT THEY WOULD LIKE IS TO SEE THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
RECONVENED. KAMEL ASKED IF THE ISRAELIS WANTED THE  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE RECONVENED IN JERUSALEM AND I SAID  
THAT IS THEIR VIEW. BEGIN FEELS THAT HAVING THE CAIRO  
COMMITTEE IN SESSION IN THE CURRENT SITUATION PUTS ISRAEL  
IN A POSITION OF INEQUALITY. I SAID BEGIN HAD ASKED THAT  
I CONVEY TO PRESIDENT SADAT HIS FORMAL PROPOSAL THAT THE  
WORK OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BE RESUMED, AND I WAS  
HEREBY DOING SO, THROUGH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. I  
ADDED THAT BEGIN HAD STRESSED THAT THIS TIME THE WORK OF  
THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A MORE  
QUIET AND BUSINESSLIKE WAY, WITHOUT CONSTANT EXPOSURE TO  
THE PRESS. KAMEL EXPRESSED SOME DOUBTS, BUT FINALLY SAID  
ONCE THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS ACHIEVED EGYPT WILL  
BE VERY READY TO RESUME THE WORK OF THE POLITICAL COMMIT-  
TEE. I SAID I HAD TOLD BEGIN WHAT PRESIDENT SADAT'S VIEW  
WAS ON THIS, BUT HE HAD NONETHELESS WANTED ME TO CONVEY  
HIS PROPOSAL, AND I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO CONVEY BACK  
TO HIM A CONSIDERED RESPONSE WHEN I RETURN TO ISRAEL.

5. I SAID I HAD PRESENTED TO BEGIN AND DAYAN ON A PURELY  
PERSONAL BASIS THE IDEA OF CONSIDERING THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF A SUBCOMMITTEE OR WORKING GROUP OF THE POLITICAL  
COMMITTEE TO BEGIN MEETING AS A STEP TOWARD FORMAL RECON-  
VENING OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE. MY IMPRESSION WAS  
THAT IF THIS IDEA COMMENDED ITSELF TO EGYPT, THE  
ISRAELIS WOULD WELCOME IT. REFERRING TO PRESS REPORTS  
OUT OF ISRAEL, AHMAD MAHER ASKED IF BEGIN HAD NOT BEEN  
THE ONE WHO BROUGHT UP THIS IDEA. I SAID NO, AN ACCOUNT  
OF OUR CONVERSATION HAD LEAKED TO THE PRESS, BUT IN THE  
PROCESS OF LEAKING IT HAD BECOME DISTORTED. AN ISRAELI  
PAPER HAD REPORTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS BEGIN'S, BUT  
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IN FACT IT WAS ENTIRELY MY OWN. BOUTROS GHALI ASKED  
WHERE THE SUBCOMMITTEE WOULD MEET; PERHAPS, HE SAID, IT  
COULD MEET IN A THIRD PLACE. THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
HEADQUARTERS WOULD STILL BE IN JERUSALEM, THE MILITARY  
COMMITTEE IN CAIRO, AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE COULD BE IN A

THIRD CITY. I SAID I COULD NOT ANSWER THE QUESTION BUT OBVIOUSLY THIS WAS SOMETHING THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED. KAMEL FIRST SAID "I DON'T KNOW", BUT THEN COMMENTED THAT EGYPT'S AND ISRAEL'S RESUMING DISCUSSION IN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, OR IN A SUBCOMMITTEE, WOULD BE MISLEADING AND "PERHAPS HAVE A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE ARAB PARTIES." KAMEL SAID HE WOULD THINK IT OVER BUT IN PRINCIPLE HE BELIEVED IT BETTER TO WAIT UNTIL THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS COMPLETED, AND RPT AND JORDAN IS READY TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, BEFORE RECONVENING WITH THE ISRAELIS.

6. KAMEL SAID AS REGARDS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, IT COULD CONTINUE IN SESSION OR ITS WORK COULD BE POSTPONED FOR A WHILE. I RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING IN BEING THIS ONE FORUM IN WHICH EGYPT AND ISRAEL MEET, AND PRESIDENT SADAT HAD AGREED. KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE THAT EGYPT ATTACHES TO THE USG'S PLAYING AN ACTIVE ROLE IN NARROWING THE GAP BETWEEN THE PARTIES. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE, HE SAID HE WAS AFRAID THAT IF IT RESUMED ITS WORK, IT WOULD VERY SOON AGAIN RUN INTO PROBLEMS. KAMEL SAID EGYPT HAS INFORMATION FROM SEVERAL SOURCES THAT BEGIN WILL POSTPONE MAKING ANY DECISIONS ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES UNTIL AFTER HIS WASHINGTON TALKS. THEREFORE, KAMEL DID NOT SEE "ANY CHANCE FOR RECONVENING NOW." I SAID IT MAY BE THAT BEGIN WILL NOT WANT TO MAKE DECISIONS NOW, BUT WE OUGHT TO TEST IF THAT IS IN FACT THE CASE. THE WAY TO TEST IS FOR

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EGYPT TO GIVE ME LANGUAGE ON THE DECLARATION TO TAKE BACK  
TO ISRAEL.

7. I URGED THAT, DESPITE THE RESERVATIONS THAT HE HAD  
EXXRESSED, THE FOREIGN MINISTER GIVE THOUGHT TO THE  
POSSIBILITY OF HAVING SOME DIRECT CONTACT IN THE  
POLITICAL COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK. I STRESSED THAT DIRECT  
CONTACT IS VERY IMPORTANT PSYCHOLOGICALLY TO THE ISRAELIS.  
DIRECT CONTACT WOULD NOT MEAN THAT THE U.S. ROLE IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE LESS. DAYAN HAD TOLD US THAT  
EVEN WHEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE TALKS ARE RECONVENED,  
THE U.S. WILL HAVE TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE. HOWEVER, IN  
THE ABSENCE OF DIRECT CONTACTS THE ISRAELIS FEEL A VOID  
AND CONSIDER THAT THERE HAS BEEN RETROGRESSION IN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS. I NOTED THAT THERE ARE MANY IN ISRAEL  
WHO HAVE CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT FOR NOT BEING FLEXIBLE  
ENOUGH, BUT WHEN THERE IS NO DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN  
EGYPT AND ISRAEL IT IS HARDER FOR THESE PEOPLE TO MAKE  
THE WEIGHT OF THEIR OPINION FELT. I SAID I DID NOT  
WANT TO OVERSTATE THE CASE, BUT I GENUINELY DID FEEL  
THAT DIRECT CONTACT DOES CREATE PRESSURRS IN ISRAEL FOR  
COMPROMISE.

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8. I SAID ONE FINAL POINT I WANTED TO COVER ON MY TALKS  
IN ISRAEL CONCERNED THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICABILITY OF  
THE WITHDRAWAL PROVISION OF RESOLUTION 242 TO ALL FRONTS.  
AT PRESIDENT SADAT'S REQUEST, PRESIDENT CARTER HAD IN-  
CLUDED IN THE STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CLOSE OF SADAT'S  
VISIT A REITERATION OF OUR VIEW THAT 242 APPLIES TO ALL  
FRONTS. THE ISRAELIS HAD CRITICIZED US FOR THIS.  
DURING MY TALKS IN JERUSALEM, BEGIN AND DAYAN HAD ARGUED  
THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO ACCEPT SUCH AN  
INTERPRETATION. I SAID I THOUGHT BEGIN'S POSITION WENT  
BACK TO THE LIKUD ELECTION PLATFORM WHICH MAINTAINED  
THAT ISRAEL HAS A CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER ALL OF  
PALESTINE WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER AND COMMITTED THE  
LIKUD NOT TO ACCEPT "OTHER SOVEREIGNTY." BECAUSE OF THIS  
THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS DEVELOPED ITS INTERPRETATION  
OF RESOLUTION 242 AS CALLING FOR WITHDRAWAL BUT NOT  
FROM ALL FRONTS. I SAID I FELT OBLIGED TO CONVEY THIS TO  
THE FOREIGN MINISTER BUT WANTED TO BE SURE THAT HE  
UNDERSTOOD I WAS DOING SO ONLY SO AS TO GIVE HIM A  
TOTALLY HONEST REPORT ON THE ISRAELI POSITION. I  
WANTED TO STRESS THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT BEGIN'S VIEW, AND  
WE HAVE TOLD BEGIN THIS QUITE CLEARLY. I SAID WE HAVE  
MADE OUR CASE QUITE STRONGLY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.  
SINCE 1967, WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERING INTERPRETA-  
TIONS AS TO WHETHER RESOLUTION CALLS FOR TOTAL WITH-

DRAWAL, IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES  
THAT RESOLUTION 242 APPLIES TO ALL FRONTS. FOR THE  
GOI TO SAY NOW THAT IT DOES NOT IS CLEARLY A CHANGE.  
I SAID BEGIN ARGUES, HOWEVER, THAT HE HAS GONE A LONG  
WAY IN PROPOSING TO SUSPEND ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY  
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF HIS SELF-RULE PLAN. DAYAN HAD SAID  
VERY EXPLICITLY THAT PROPOSALS FOR WEST BANK WITHDRAWAL  
COULD BE DISCUSSED AS SOON AS NEGOTIATIONS START; BEGIN

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AND DAYAN SAY THEY CANNOT MAKE A COMMITMENT ON WITHDRAWAL  
FROM THE WEST BANK BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN, BUT DAYAN  
INDICATED THAT THE GOI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL COULD  
CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

9. KAMEL SAID THAT AS LONG AS BEGIN IS PRIME MINISTER HE  
FELT THAT BEGIN'S VIEW, NOT DAYAN'S, WILL PREVAIL. THE  
POSITION THAT 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO ALL FRONTS IS SIMPLY  
UNACCEPTABLE, KAMEL SAID; "I DON'T CARE WHAT THE  
PROGRAM OF THE LIKUD WAS." I AGAIN POINTED OUT THAT I  
HAD BROUGHT THIS UP ONLY BECAUSE I FELT IT NECESSARY  
TO REPORT THE ISRAELI VIEW. I REITERATED THAT WE DO NOT  
AGREE WITH THAT VIEW. KAMEL SAID IF THE ISRAELIS STICK TO  
THE INTERPRETATION THAT 242 DOES NOT APPLY TO ALL FRONTS,  
"WE WILL NEVER HAVE AGREEMENT."

10. KAMEL SAID THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS VERY CONCERNED THAT  
WHEN PRIME MINISTER BEGIN GETS TO WASHINGTON THE USG  
WILL MODIFY THE POSITIONS SET FORTH IN THE STATEMENT  
ISSUED AT THE CLOSE OF SADAT'S VISIT. ISRAEL'S FRIENDS  
IN THE UNITED STATES WILL "PUT PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT  
TO DO SO." KAMEL SAID PRESIDENT SADAT HAD ASKED HIM TO  
CONVEY TO US THAT HE CONSIDERS IT OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE  
THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HOLD TO THE FEBRUARY STATEMENT.  
IF IT WERE MODIFIED, SADAT WOULD BE IN A VERY SERIOUS  
SITUATION; HE COULD NOT FACE THE ARAB WORLD. I SAID THE  
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT REMAINS FULLY OUR POSITION. KAMEL  
REITERATED (SADAT HAD MENTIONED IT TO HIM EVERY FEW  
MINUTES) THAT SADAT IS VERY WORRIED ABOUT THIS AND IT  
IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE U.S. HOLD FIRM. "WE ARE  
PUTTING ALL OUR CARDS ON THE U.S.," HE SAID. KAMEL SAID  
EGYPT COULD ACCEPT PHASED WITHDRAWAL, DEMILITARIZATION  
AND OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND MINOR MODIFICATIONS

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ON THE WEST BANK, BUT REITERATED THAT IT COULD NOT  
ACCEPT AN ISRAELI CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY.

11. WE THEN TURNED TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. KAMEL  
SAID SADAT IS VERY KEEN ON PURSUING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE  
DECLARATION. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DECLARATION  
AND POINTED OUT THAT THE WORLD LOOKS UPON IT AS A TEST  
OF THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FLOWING FROM  
SADAT'S INITIATIVE. KAMEL AGREED AND SAID HE WAS PLEASED  
THAT I HAD NOT PRESENTED EITHER EGYPT'S FEBRUARY 1 PAPER  
OR THE LATEST PAPER (THE AL-BAZ PAPER) BECAUSE  
FOLLOWING HIS TALK WITH AMBASSADOR EILTS FEBRUARY 22,  
PRESIDENT SADAT HAD DECIDED TO WITHDRAW THE LATEST PAPER  
AND GO BACK TO THE FEBRUARY 1 TEXT. EILTS AND I SAID  
THAT WE THOUGHT THIS WAS THE RIGHT DECISION. IT WAS BEST  
TO BUILD ON WHAT WAS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED AND NOT MAKE  
MAJOR CHANGES IN THE FORMAT AND CONTENT, AS THE LATEST  
PAPER HAD. KAMEL SAID THIS WAS HIS VIEW ALSO. I ASKED  
IF KAMEL WAS SAYING THAT EGYPT WANTED ME TO CONVEY TO  
ISRAEL THE PAPER HE HAD GIVEN ME ON FEBRUARY 1. KAMEL  
SAID YES BUT NOT WITH THE FEBRUARY 1 DATE. GIVE IT TODAY'S  
DATE, HE SAID.

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12. I THEN SAID I WANTED TO GO OVER BRIEFLY THE HISTORY  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DECLARATION. DURING HIS  
MEETINGS IN JERUSALEM WITH KAMEL AND DAYAN, THE  
SECRETARY HAD TRIED TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON THE  
DECLARATION. THIS WORK RESULTED IN THE PAPER THAT THE  
SECRETARY DISCUSSED WITH KAMEL AND DAYAN ON JANUARY 18  
AND LATER GAVE IN SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION TO SADAT ON

JANUARY 20. AS A RESULT OF OUR TALKS IN JERUSALEM ON JANUARY 18 WE HAD THOUGHT WE HAD A DRAFT WHICH HAD AT LEAST THE INFORMAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. WE RECOGNIZED THAT NO FORMAL APPROVAL WAS GIVEN, BUT WE FELT THAT THE JANUARY 18 LANGUAGE HAD BEEN AGREED AT LEAST INFORMALLY AND AD REFERENDUM. I NOTED HOWEVER THAT CHANGES INTO THE DRAFT GIVEN PRESIDENT SADAT BY THE SECRETARY JANUARY 20. I POINTED OUT IN PARTICULAR THAT IN PARAGRAPH 2 THE EGYPTIANS HAD GONE BACK TO THE PHRASE CONCERNING RESOLUTION 242 "IN ALL ITS PARTS." WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS VERY THOROUGHLY AND HAD FINALLY COME UP WITH "ALL THE PRINCIPLES OF" RESOLUTION 242, AND WE FELT THIS FULLY COVERED THE PROBLEM THE EGYPTIANS HAD IN MIND. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLORE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD GET BACK AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE TO THE JANUARY 20 TEXT. IF THE ISRAELIS ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER MODIFYING SOME OF THEIR LANGUAGE, I SAID, COULD KAMEL TELL ME WHERE EGYPT WOULD BE READY TO CONSIDER MAKING CHANGES?

13. KAMEL SAID SADAT HAD TOLD HIM IN THEIR MEETING TODAY THAT HE HAD FELT THAT THE WAY NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING IN JERUSALEM WAS NOT LEADING TO THE KIND OF DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES HE WANTED. HE HAD THE FEELING THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD COME OUT WITH FORMULATIONS CLOSER TO ISRAELI IDEAS THAN TO EGYPTIAN IDEAS. THIS WAS ONE OF THE REASONS FOR HIS ORDER TO THE EGYPTIAN DELEGATION TO

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RETURN. KAMEL STRESSED THAT SADAT WANTS A CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES. KAMEL SAID SADAT WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISRAELI TACTIC IN NEGOTIATING. HE FELT THAT THE ISRAELIS TOOK CONCESSIONS THAT EGYPT MADE TO THE AMERICANS AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATING FURTHER CONCESSIONS. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT SADAT HAD THE IDEA OF THE LATEST (AL-BAZ) DRAFT. HE FELT THAT IF EGYPT MADE COMPROMISES CONCERNING ITS TEXT, ISRAEL WOULD SIMPLY SEEK FURTHER COMPROMISES.

14. I SAID I WOULD CONVEY PRESIDENT SADAT'S CONCERNs ON THESE MATTERS. ON A MORE GENERAL LEVEL I THOUGHT THE KEY PROBLEM CONCERNING THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IS THE LANGUAGE OF THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. I SAID WE HAVE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT WE THINK THEY WILL ULTIMATELY HAVE TO MOVE SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASWAN LANGUAGE. I POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT AGREED TO DO SO, AND THAT TO GET THEM TO ACCEPT THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WILL BE A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT. THE UNDERTAKING WILL BE MADE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT IF EGYPT INSISTS ON INSERTING LANGUAGE THAT THE ISRAELIS CONSIDER OBJECTIONABLE ON OTHER ISSUES; BY THIS I MEANT,

IN PARTICULAR, THE REFERENCE TO 242 "IN ALL ITS PARTS"  
AND THE LANGUAGE ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION  
OF TERRITORY BY WAR WHICH THE EGYPTIANS HAD INSERTED  
IN PARAGRAPH 4 IN THEIR FEBRUARY 1 DRAFT. WHILE THESE  
POINTS MAY BE IMPORTANT TO THE EGYPTIANS, I WAS SURE  
THAT THEY ARE NOT NEARLY AS IMPORTANT AS SATISFACTORY  
LANGUAGE ON THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH. KAMEL  
ASKED WHY SHOULDN'T THE LANGUAGE ON THE INADMISSIBILITY OF  
THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY WAR BE INCLUDED. I  
REITERATED THAT I WAS NOT SAYING THAT IT WAS NOT VALID.  
BUT I DID BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE GOING TO GET ACCEPTANCE  
OF PRESIDENT'S ASWAN LANGUAGE IN THE PALESTINIAN PARAGRAPH  
IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO HAVE A BIG FIGHT OVER OTHER  
POINTS.

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15. KAMEL THEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S ASWAN LANGUAGE

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EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

WOULD BE "ALRIGHT WITH US PROVIDED IT HAS JORDANIAN  
APPROVAL." BUT, KAMEL ADDED, "WE WON'T ACCEPT IT IF IT  
DOES NOT MEAN THAT HUSSEIN WILL COME IN." KAMEL SAID THAT  
I SHOULD DISCUSS THE DECLARATION WITH HUSSEIN, AND HE  
WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO LEARNING WHAT HUSSEIN HAS TO SAY.  
I SAID I WOULD, BUT I ASKED IF THE EGYPTIANS WOULD BE

HAVING CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN. KAMEL SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH SADAT AND ASKED SADAT TO LET HIM HAVE A GO AT IT WITH THE JORDANIANS. HOWEVER, SADAT IS "RATHER RELUCTANT TO DO SO." KAMEL INDICATED THAT EGYPTIAN CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN ARE NOT RULED OUT BUT SAID THAT IN ANY CASE SADAT WANTS TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER I HAVE TALKED TO HUSSEIN.

16. I SAID THIS MAKES IT ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT THAT WE BEGIN TO TALK ABOUT WHAT THE DECLARATION WOULD MEAN IN CONCRETE TERMS CONCERNING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. I SAID I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS BOTH WITH THE ISRAELIS AND HUSSEIN FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. BUT FIRST WE NEED TO KNOW WHAT EGYPTIAN VIEWS ARE; WE NEED TO GET EGYPT'S IDEAS. I SAID IT WAS VERY IMPORTANT TO BEGIN THIS PROCESS BEFORE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON. THE MORE

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GROUNDWORK WE CAN LAY IN THIS REGARD THE MORE PRODUCTIVE THE VISIT WILL BE. KAMEL ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DURING SADAT'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON THERE WAS UNDERSTANDING THAT EGYPT WOULD PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, BUT ON REFLECTION HE WAS NOT AT ALL SURE THAT IT WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO SO BEFORE THE BEGIN VISIT. PRESENTING ITS VIEWS BEFORE THE BEGIN VISIT HAD SOUNDED VERY LOGICAL AT CAMP DAVID. HOWEVER, KAMEL SAID, IF WE COME OUT NOW WITH A PROPOSAL REGARDING WEST BANK AND GAZA, IT WILL BE A VERY STRONG PROPOSAL AND THE ISRAELIS MIGHT REACT VERY SHARPLY TO IT, AND THE WHOLE PEACE PROCESS MIGHT BE AFFECTED. EGYPT'S POSITION WOULD HAVE TO "DEAL SQUARELY WITH THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION," AND EGYPT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO MAKE CLEAR ITS VIEWS ON ARAB SOVEREIGNTY IN EAST JERUSALEM. KAMEL SAID HE KNEW WHAT A "VITAL MATTER" JERUSALEM IS FOR BEGIN, AND HE REPEATED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT BEGIN'S POSSIBLE REACTION. IT MIGHT KILL PROSPECTS FOR A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, KAMEL SAID.

17. I POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A FINAL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, ONLY ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING A FULL-BLOWN EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL TO HAND TO THE ISRAELIS. WHAT WE NEED AT THIS STAGE ARE GENERAL IDEAS WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO ENTER INTO AN EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL. I POINTED OUT THAT IN OUR MIDDLEMAN ROLE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE U.S TO PRESENT VIEWS OF ITS OWN BEFORE HAVING THE VIEWS OF BOTH THE OTHER PARTIES. AMBASSADOR EILTS SAID IT IS TRUE THAT IF EGYPT WERE TO PUT OUT A PLAN FOR A FULL

SOLUTION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA PROBLEM IT MIGHT BE  
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER HE POINTED  
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OUT THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD SAID THAT IF AT THE END  
OF FIVE YEARS SELF-RULE EVOLVES INTO A PALESTINIAN  
ENTITY LINKED WITH JORDAN, HE COULD ACCEPT SELF-RULE.  
WHAT WE HOPED FOR, EILTS SAID, ARE EGYPT'S IDEAS CONCERNING  
THE MODALITIES FOR THIS INTERIM PERIOD. VISIBLY UNCOM-  
FORTABLE, KAMEL SAID THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT MATTER  
AND HE WOULD PREFER TO SLEEP ON IT.

18. I SAID WE DO HAVE SOME IDEAS OF OUR OWN ON THE  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, BUT I  
REITERATED THAT IN ORDER TO PUT THEM FORWARD WE WOULD  
NEED FIRST TO HAVE EGYPT'S IDEAS. I SAID WE ATTACH  
GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THIS AND I HAD FORMAL INSTRUCTIONS  
TO SEEK EGYPT'S AGREEMENT TO GIVE US ITS VIEWS.  
I NOTED THAT I HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF DISCUSSION OF  
GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA  
DURING MY TALKS IN ISRAEL AND HAD FOUND THE ISRAELIS  
NOT PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO DEAL WITH THE SUBJECT.  
BOUTROS GHALI SAID EGYPT HAS NO MANDATE FOR THE WEST  
BANK AND GAZA. ON THIS ISSUE IT NEEDS JORDAN'S  
PRESENCE MORE THAN EVER. AMBASSADOR EILTS POINTED OUT THAT  
EGYPT DOES HAVE A MANDATE FOR GAZA AND THAT PLANS FOR  
GAZA MIGHT ALSO BE APPLICABLE TO THE WEST BANK; THIS  
WOULD GIVE EGYPT A DOOR FOR GETTING INTO THE SUBJECT.  
I SAID I COULD UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM EGYPT FACES,  
BUT HUSSEIN WILL SAY THAT HE MUST HAVE A BETTER IDEA AS  
TO WHAT THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WILL MEAN IN  
CONCRETE TERMS BEFORE HE WILL AGREE TO JOIN THE  
NEGOTIATIONS. AT THE MOMENT, THE ONLY PROPOSAL WE  
HAVE ON THE TABLE FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA IS THE  
BEGIN SELF-RULE PLAN. IN ORDER TO GO BEYOND THAT, I  
WILL NEED ARAB PROPOSALS. I POINTED OUT THAT WE ARE  
IN A VICIOUS CIRCLE AND NEED TO FIND A WAY TO BREAK OUT

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EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS)

OF IT. KAMEL SUGGESTED THAT WHEN I SEE HUSSEIN, I SHOULD ASK WHAT HIS VIEWS ARE. I AGREED BUT SAID HE WILL SIMPLY WANT TO KNOW EGYPT'S VIEWS AND OURS. BOUTROS GHALI SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE BEST WAY TO PROCEED WOULD BE TO GET COMMON GROUND BETWEEN EGYPT AND JORDAN. I POINTED OUT THAT SOMEONE HAS TO GO FIRST, AND EGYPT HAS TAKEN THE LEADERSHIP ROLE ON THE ARAB SIDE IN THE PEACE PROCESS. KAMEL SAID HE THOUGHT IT PREFERABLE FOR HUSSEIN TO GIVE US HIS VIEWS FIRST "AND THEN WE CAN FIT OUR VIEWS IN WITH HIS; WE COULD PUT OUR TWO VIEWS TOGETHER AND MAKE SOMETHING OUT OF THEM." KAMEL REITERATED, HOWEVER, THAT PRESIDENT SADAT IS RELUCTANT TO HAVE DIRECT TALKS WITH THE JORDANIANS ON THIS MATTER.

19. I POINTED OUT THAT WE FACE A PROBLEM OF TIME. I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SEE HUSSEIN BEFORE MARCH 3 OR 4. IF THE FOREIGN MINISTER INSISTED ON WAITING UNTIL AFTER MY MEETING WITH HUSSEIN WE WILL LOSE MORE THAN A WEEK. I SAID IT WOULD BE A SHAME FOR THIS TO HAPPEN, WITH BEGIN VISIT STARTING MARCH 14. WE SHOULD PUT THAT TIME TO GOOD USE. AHMAD MAHER ASKED IF WE WANTED EGYPT'S GENERAL VIEWS FOR OUR USE ONLY, NOT TO BE CONVEYED TO ANYONE ELSE. I SAID WE WILL, OF COURSE, DO WHATEVER THE

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EGYPTIANS WANT, BUT IT WOULD BE BEST IF I COULD HAVE SOME GENERAL IDEAS TO USE IN A GENERAL EXPLORATORY WAY WITH THE OTHER PARTIES. KAMEL SAID IF THE ISRAELIS ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT DISCUSSING THE WEST BANK NOW, PERHAPS THAT IS A GOOD REASON FOR NOT DOING SO. I SAID I HAD ASSUMED KAMEL UNDERSTOOD WHY THE ISRAELIS WERE NOT EAGER TO BEGIN SUCH DISCUSSIONS--THEY DO NOT WANT TO HAVE TO MODIFY THE BEGIN PLAN. KAMEL SAID NONETHELESS PERHAPS WE COULD LEAVE ASIDE DISCUSSION WITH THE ISRAELIS FOR THE MOMENT AND CONCENTRATE ON TALKS WITH HUSSEIN, GETTING HIS IDEAS AND PRODUCING AN EGYPTIAN-JORDANIAN FORMULATION; THEN WE COULD GO TO THE ISRAELIS. I NOTED THAT THIS WOULD CAUSE US A SERIOUS

LOSS OF TIME. I ALSO POINTED OUT THAT I THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT THE UNITED STATES NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE ROLE OF MIDDLEMAN BETWEEN JORDAN AND EGYPT, AS KAMEL SEEMED TO BE SUGGESTING.

20. KAMEL AGAIN SAID HE WOULD SLEEP ON IT. EILTS AND I REITERATED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF THE EGYPTIANS COULD GIVE US IDEAS TO USE WITH THE ISRAELIS AND JORDANIANS, BUT WE URGED THAT, IF THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE, AT THE VERY LEAST THEY COULD LET US HAVE THEIR THINKING FOR OUR USE ONLY. KAMEL DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS, BUT HE SAID WHEN EGYPT TALKS ABOUT THE WEST BANK HE WOULD PREFER THAT IT DO SO TOGETHER WITH HUSSEIN AND ALSO WITH THE PALESTINIANS, ALTHOUGH HE COMMENTED THAT THE MATTER OF REPRESENTATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS IS ANOTHER PROBLEM AND CAN BE POSTPONED FOR THE TIME BEING. KAMEL AGAIN SAID "LET'S SLEEP ON IT." I SAID I WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH KAMEL AGAIN BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR ISRAEL AND WOULD HOLD MYSELF AT HIS DISPOSAL. KAMEL INITIALLY SAID HE REALLY DID NOT SEE NEED FOR ANOTHER MEETING

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RIGHT AWAY. WE COULD DISCUSS THIS AGAIN WHEN I COME BACK FROM ISRAEL NEXT WEEK.

21. KAMEL SAID PRESIDENT SADAT HAD TOLD HIM DURING THEIR MEETING TODAY THAT HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE ME IF I WISHED, BUT KAMEL NOTED THAT SADAT REALLY DOES HAVE A BAD COLD AND IS NOT RECEIVING VISITORS. I SAID I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT I NOT BOTHER HIM AT LEAST FOR NOW. KAMEL HAD SAID SADAT MADE CLEAR THAT HE WANTS TO SEE ME BEFORE I GO BACK TO WASHINGTON. I ASKED KAMEL TO TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT I WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO CALLING ON HIM DURING ONE OF MY VISITS TO CAIRO. I ASKED KAMEL ALSO TO CONVEY TO SADAT OUR REELING THAT THE SOONER WE GET STARTED DISCUSSING GUIDELINES FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA THE BETTER. AS THE MEETING CONCLUDED, KAMEL AGREED THAT IF THE PRESS ASK ME WHETHER I WOULD BE SEEING PRESIDENT SADAT, I SHOULD SAY THAT I EXPECT TO CALL ON HIM AT SOME POINT DURING MY CURRENT VISIT TO THE AREA. (AS REPORTED SEPARATELY, KAMEL TOLD EILTS LATER THIS EVENING THAT SADAT WANTS TO SEE US FRIDAY MORNING.) EILTS

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